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Kapp: Water Law - Statutory Forfeiture of Water Rights in Wyoming - Whe
WATER LAW-Statutory Forfeiture of Water Rights In Wyoming. Wheatland
Irrigation District v. Laramie Rivers Co., 659 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1983).
The Laramie Rivers Company held two reservoir permits for the
storage of 68,500 acre feet of water in Lake Hattie, a reservoir located
west of Laramie in Albany County, Wyoming. Canals from the Laramie
and Little Laramie Rivers provided the source of supply for the reservoir.
On April 5, 1972, the Wyoming State Engineer imposed a restriction
on the reservoir, limiting the amount of water which could be stored to
27,400 acre feet because of weaknesses in the dam. 1 The restriction was to
remain in effect until repairs were made to restore the dam to a safe
condition.
Between 1972 and 1980, the Laramie Rivers Company made repeated
efforts to obtain funds to repair the dam.2 Finally, in March, 1980, the
Wyoming Farm Loan Board approved a loan for $90,000.8 Within two
weeks, Laramie Rivers Company submitted plans for repair of the dam to
the State Engineer. 4 The State Engineer approved the plans and Laramie
Rivers Company entered into a contract with Barker Construction Company. Work began on the dam on May 4, 1980 and repairs were completed
on July 7.5
Prior to completion of the repairs, on May 23, Wheatland Irrigation
District filed a forfeiture petition with the Board of Control.6 The District
sought a declaration that Laramie Rivers Company had forfeited its rights
to 41,100 acre feet of water, the difference between the original adjudicated capacity of 68,500 acre feet and the restriction of 27,400 acre feet
imposed by the State Engineer in 1972.7 The District had standing because
it held a reservoir permit junior to that of Laramie Rivers Company for
storage of water in Wheatland Reservoir No. 3, which also receives its
water from the Laramie River." In its petition, the District alleged that
Laramie Rivers Company had failed to use the 41,100 acre feet of water for
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated during five successive
years; therefore, that portion should be declared forfeited pursuant to section 41-3-401 of the Wyoming Statutes. 9
1. Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Laramie Rivers Co., 659 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo. 1983).
2. Brief for Appellees Laramie Rivers Co. and the University of Wyoming at 2, Wheatland
Irrigation Dist. v. Laramie Rivers Co., 659 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1983).
3. The amount was later increased to $142,000. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3.
6. 659 P.2d at 561.
7. Id. at 562.
8. Id.
9. Id. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3401 (1977) provides in part:
(a) Where the holder of an appropriation of water from a surface,
underground or reservoir water source fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for the beneficial purposes for which it was
appropriated, whether under an adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any
five (5)successive years, he is considered as having abandoned the water right
and shall forfeit all water rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. Notwithstanding any provision in this section to the contrary, the holder of an appropriation for the diversion and storage of water in a reservoir, from which
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The Board of Control denied the petition, holding that the forfeiture action was not promptly asserted in that prior to its commencement Laramie
Rivers Company had undertaken substantial work to repair the dam. 10 To
grant the petition, the Board concluded, "would be to deny [Laramie
Rivers Company] the fruits of its efforts to repair the dam . . . ."I The
District Court for the Second Judicial District affirmed the Board's order
of denial.12
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment,
finding that the petition was promptly asserted.'5 The court held that section 41-3-401 of the Wyoming Statutes provides that a forfeiture may be
avoided only by application of the water to beneficial use, and not by undertaking repairs of the dam.' 4 The court directed the district court to remand
the case to the Board of Control for determination of whether Laramie
Rivers Company had used the water in accordance with the statute and, if
not, whether there was reasonable cause for nonuse.' 5

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

water or a portion thereof has not yet been beneficially used for the purposes
for which appropriated, may apply to the board of control for an extension of
time not to exceed five (5) years, within which to use. water therefrom for the
beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated. In the application the holder
shall demonstrate the exercise of due diligence toward the utilization of the appropriation, and that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, reasonable
cause exists for nonuse. Reasonable cause indudes but is not limited to delay
due to court or administrative proceedings, time required in planning, developing, financing and constructing projects for the application of stored water to
beneficial use which require in excess of five (5) years to complete, delay due to
requirement of state and federal statutes and rules and regulations thereunder
and any other causes beyond the control of the holder of the appropriation.
Upon receipt of an application for extension, the board of control shall proceed
under the provisions of W.S. 9-276.19 through 9-276.33 [SS 9-4-101 through
9-4-115] and may grant an extension of time as it finds proper, not to exceed
five (5) years, for the application of the appropriated water to the beneficial use
for which it was appropriated. A prior grant of extension of time hereunder
does not preclude the holder from applying for additional extensions of time
each not to exceed five (5) years, upon similar application and showing: The
granting of an extension of time precludes the commencement of an abandonment action against the appropriation during the period of extension.
(b) When any water user who might be affected by a declaration of abandonment of existing water rights, desires to bring about a legal declaration of
abandonment, he shall present his case in writing to the state board of control.
The board has exclusive original jurisdiction in water right abandonment proceedings. The board shall, if the facts so justify, refer the matter to the
superintendent of the water division where the abandonment is claimed to have
occurred. The total absence of water to divert during an irrigation season
precludes the inclusion of any such period of nonuse resulting therefrom in the
computation of the successive five (5) year period.
Petition of Wheatland Irrigation District, State Board of Control, Order Record No. 25,
p. 71, Oct. 6, 1981.
Id.
659 P.2d at 561.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568. On remand, the Board of Control declared the Larainie Rivers Company's
water right forfeited down to the elevation of 7263. However, it was noted that there was
a question as to the actual capacity of the reservoir as evidenced by the proof of appropriation and the water right filing maps. It appeared that a present day priority water
right might be as valuable to Laramie Rivers Company as their present right. Minutes,
State Board of Control Meeting in Cheyenne, Wyoming, pps. 31-32, August, 1983.
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BACKGROUND

The Statute
Section 41-3-401 of the Wyoming Statutes was enacted in 1888.16 With
two principal exceptions, 7 the statute has remained basically unchanged
since that time. The statute provides in part that an appropriator who fails
to use the water for the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated
for five successive years forfeits his water right. 18 It further provides that
the holder of an appropriation for diversion or storage of water in a reservoir which has not yet been beneficially used may apply for an extension. 19
Upon demonstrating reasonable cause for nonuse, the holder may receive
an extension from the Board of Control for up to five years, thus precluding
the commencement of a forfeiture action during that time.2 0 Additional extensions thereafter are also available under the statute. However, the extension provision applies only where water "has not yet" been used. It is
not available to an appropriator who wishes to resume use of a temporarily
unused right.
The statute further provides that any water user who might be affected
by a declaration of forfeiture may file a petition with the Board of Control
to bring about a legal declaration of forfeiture. 21 Finally, section 41-3-402
Engineer may initiate
of the Wyoming Statutes provides that the State
22
forfeiture proceedings with the Board of Control.
Despite the various amendments to the forfeiture statute, 23 the purpose underlying it has remained unchanged since its enactment. In accordance with the policy prevalent throughout the arid western states, the
statute was designed to ensure that water, a scarce and critical resource,
was used in an efficient and beneficial manner. As the Wyoming Supreme
Court has stated, "it is the policy in this state, along with that of all the arid
regions, that its water should be put to the highest possible use ....[N]o
16. 1888 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 55., § 14.
17. An amendment in 1905 extended the period of nonuse from two to five years. 1905 WYo.
SEss. LAWS Ch. 39., § 1. An amendment in 1977 allowed an appropriator who had not yet
put the water to beneficial use to apply for an extension of up to five years. 1977 WYo.
SEss. LAWS

Ch. 126., § 1.

18. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-401 (1977). See supra note 9. Although the statute uses both the term
"forfeit" and the term "abandoned" the former is technically the correct term. Abandonment is a court created doctrine requiring intent by an appropriator to abandon a water
right. Forfeiture is a statutory doctrine and results from the failure, either intentional or
unintentional, of an appropriator to use the water to which he is entitled. For a general
discussion of the distinction between abandonment and statutory forfeiture of water
rights see 2 HUTCHnS, WATER RIGHTS LAW IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 306,
325 (1974).
19. WYo. STAT. § 41-3-401 (1977). The extension provision was enacted for the limited purpose of protecting the right of Texaco to store water in Lake DeSmet for future use. It
applies only when a reservoir has been constructed and is storing water but has not yet
put the water to beneficial use. The provision is an attempt to provide incentive for the
development of reservoirs when there is no immediate use for the water by excepting the
water therein from forfeiture under the statute. Letter from Lawrence J. Wolfe, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, State of Wyoming, to author (November 17, 1983).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-402(a) (1977).
23. See supra note 17.
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of any part of it for mere future
one should be able to get control
3 '' 4
speculative profit or advantage.
The rationale behind this policy is clear: in an area where water is in
short supply and yet subject to great demand, an appropriator should not
be allowed to maintain a water right through extended periods of nonuse
when others may be able to put it to use and thereby further development
and production.2 6
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of the policy of maximum use of available water,26 it has not been that
policy upon which the court has traditionally relied in construing the
Wyoming forfeiture statute. Instead, the court has relied on the well27
established legal principle that forfeitures are not favored by the courts.
A review of Wyoming case law prior to the Laramie Rivers decision illustrates the important role this principle has played in previous forfeiture
cases.
Wyoming Case Law
Wyoming had scarcely achieved statehood when the supreme court was
confronted with its first major case dealing with water rights. In FarmInvestment Co. v. Carpenter,2 8 the court carefully outlined the nature and extent of the right granted by the Wyoming Constitution 29 and the forfeiture
statute. 0 While acknowledging that the right established by appropriation
amounts to a property right, the court emphasized that the right does not
attach to the water as it flows along its natural channel. Rather, the right
attaches to the use of a specified amount of water for beneficial purposes,
and its perpetuation is dependent upon an appropriation "lawfully made
and continued. "31 In other words, the right is vested only so long as the appropriator continues to make beneficial use of the full amount of water to
which he is entitled.
While thus recognizing the policy underlying the statute, the court has
consistently held that forfeitures of water rights are not favored in law. In
Ramsay v. Gottsche 2 the court's dislike of forfeitures was reflected in its
24. Scherck v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4, 20, 95 P.2d 74, 78-79 (1939).
25. 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 2021 (2d ed. 1912).

26. Scherck v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4, 20, 95 P.2d 74, 78-79 (1939).
27. Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 535 (1937).
28. 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900).
29. WYO.CONST. art. 1,

§ 31

provides:

"Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of
diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state, which, in
providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved."
WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 1 provides:
"The water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still
water, within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state."
WYo.CONST. art. 8,

§

3 provides:

"Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the better right. No ap-

propriation shall be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public
interests."
30. 1890 Wyo. Sass. LAws Ch. 8.
31. 61 P. at 265.
32. 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 535 (1937).
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holding that forfeitures must be shown by clear and convincing evidence38
and that, despite the statute, an appropriator would not be deemed to have
forfeited his right where his failure to use the
water for the statutory
34
period was caused by disastrous flood waters.
The court's reluctance to declare forfeitures was again reflected in
Horse Creek ConservationDistrict v. Lincoln Land Co.3 5 There, the court
held that when an appropriator used as much of his entitlement as was
available, nonuse of the remaining portion was excused. 8 In Scherck v.
Nichols, ' the court extended this trend of cases by holding that forfeiture
must be voluntary and that a water right could not be held to be forfeited if
nonuse was caused by circumstances beyond the appropriator's control. 38
That forfeitures are not favored by the court is also reflected in cases
holding that forfeitures do not occur automatically after nonuse for the
statutory period. Instead, a formal declaration of forfeiture must be
obtained. s9
The major case upon which both parties in Laramie Rivers relied to
support their claims was Sturgeon v. Brooks,40 in which the Wyoming
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that forfeitures are not favored
and must be promptly asserted or will be waived. 4 The water right in question had not been applied to beneficial use for approximately twenty
years. 4 2 By the time the forfeiture petition was filed, however, the appropriator had twice repaired the dam and had recommenced use of the
water. 48 The court held that the petition was not timely filed. 44 Because
forfeitures are not favored and must be promptly asserted, and because the
dam had been repaired twice and the water put back to use, the court
reasoned that it would be inequitable to hold that the appropriator's rights
were forfeited. 45
46
More recently, in Wheatland IrrigationDist. v. Pioneer Canal Co.,
the court reaffirmed the legal precept that forfeitures are not favored
unless justified by clear and convincing evidence. 47 The facts involved an
appropriator who allowed a portion of the water to which he was entitled
under a reservoir permit to seep through the dam for a period of five years.
No attempt was made to either repair the dam or recommence storage of
the adjudicated amount prior to the commencement of the forfeiture action." The court found the evidence of forfeiture to be both clear and convincing and declared the right forfeited.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

69 P2d at 539.
Id. at 541.
54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572 (1939).
92 P.2d at 577.
55 Wyo. 4, 95 P.2d 74 (1939).
95 P.2d at 80.
Horse Creek Conservation District v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 340, 92 P.2d 572,
579 (1939); Sturgeon v. Brooks, 73 Wyo. 436, 458, 281 P.2d 675, 683 (1955).
73 Wyo. 436, 281 P.2d 675 (1955).
281 P.2d at 683.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45. Id.
46. 464 P.2d 533 (Wyo. 1970).
47. Id. at 537.
48. Id. at 539.
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The cases described above illustrate the traditional approach taken by
the Wyoming Supreme Court in applying the Wyoming forfeiture statute.
None of these cases, however, directly addressed the question of whether
commencement of activities other than use of the water prior to the filing
of a forfeiture petition would be sufficient to prevent forfeiture. In
Sturgeon, the court held that an appropriator who had repaired the dam
and recommenced use of the water prior to the filing of the forfeiture petition had not forfeited his right.49 In Pioneer Canal,the court held that an
appropriator who had not repaired the dam or recommenced use of50the
water prior to the time the petition was filed had forfeited his right. In
Laramie Rivers, the court encountered for the first time an appropriator
who had begun repairs but had not recommenced use of the water when-the
forfeiture petition was filed.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In LaramieRivers, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district
court's ruling upholding the Board of Control's denial of the forfeiture petition. The Board had found that the forfeiture was not promptly asserted for
the reason that prior to commencement of the action Laramie Rivers Company had undertaken substantial work to repair the dam in order to recommence storage to the full adjudicated amount. 51 In reaching its holding, the
Board relied in part on prior Wyoming case law in which the maxim that
forfeitures are not favored was applied. 52
In overturning the Board's order, the Wyoming Supreme Court relied
on the principle that in construing a legislative enactment the court must, if
possible, ascertain the intent of the legislature from the wording of the
statute and must give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. 58 On
this basis, the court held that section 41-3-401 of the Wyoming Statutes requires forfeiture whenever nonuse of the water is shown for the statutory
five year period. 64 The only use which will save an appropriator from the
"gnashing teeth" of the statute is beneficial use of the water itself.55 Activities aimed at restoring beneficial use are of no avail, even if begun prior
to commencement of the forfeiture action.
Further, the court stated that the statute precludes the Board of Control and the courts from denying a forfeiture petition when an appropriator
has failed to beneficially use the water for five successive years. 6 While
acknowledging the validity of the precept that forfeitures are not favored,
the court stated that the Board's reliance on it in this case was misplaced. 57
When the legislature has established a clear directive and the facts of a case
49. 281 P.2d at 684.
50. 464 P.2d at 540.
51. Petition of Wheatland Irrigation District, State Board of Control, Order Record No. 25,
p. 71, Oct. 6, 1981.

52. Id. at 70.
53. 659 P.2d at 564.
54. Id. at 565.
55. Id. at 567.

56. Id. at 565.
57. Id. at 566.
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satisfy the requirements of that directive, the 5court concluded, the Board
and the courts have no choice but to follow it.8
Turning to the Board's application of prior case law, the supreme court
again rejected the Board's conclusions. The Board had concluded that
Sturgeon v. Brooks stood for the proposition that forfeitures must be
promptly asserted or will be waived. 69 Based on that premise, the Board
held that the forfeiture in Laramie Rivers was not promptly asserted
because, prior to its commencement, Laramie Rivers Company had begun
repairs on the dam."0 The supreme court rejected the Board's holding,
stating that a petition could not be denied under the statute on the ground
that it was not timely filed if it was filed before the contested water was
restored to beneficial use.6 1 In Laramie Rivers, the court concluded, the
prompt assertion rule had no relevance because the petition was filed prior
to the resumption of actual use of the water.62 In contrast, the appropriator
in Sturgeon had not only repaired the dam prior to commencement of the
forfeiture action, he had resumed use of the water. 3 Thus, the rule of law
established in Laramie Rivers is that efforts to restore a water right are
not sufficient to prevent forfeiture absent actual use of the water prior to
commencement of the forfeiture action.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

In Laramie Rivers, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted an unusually
strict approach in construing the Wyoming forfeiture statute but failed to
justify its position in light of prior case law. Traditionally, when confronted
with a case brought under the forfeiture statute, the court has relied on the
precept that forfeitures are not favored.64 In LaramieRivers, however, the
court abandoned its traditional approach in favor of strict statutory construction. 5 While that approach is consistent with the method employed in
at least one other jurisdiction, 6 it is clearly inconsistent with the principle
endorsed repeatedly by the Wyoming Supreme Court that forfeitures are
not favored. It may well be inconsistent with the policy of promoting
beneficial use of available water as well.
In Laramie Rivers, the court justified its conclusion that the abhorrence of forfeiture maxim was inapplicable by stating that section 41-3-401
of the Wyoming Statutes compelled the court to forfeit the right in question. 67 Yet under earlier forms of the same statute,6 8 the court relied
58. Id. at 565.
59. Petition of Wheatland Irrigation District, State Board of Control, Order Record No. 25,
p. 70, Oct. 6, 1981.
60. Id. at 71.
61. 659 P.2d at 566.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
66. Baugh v. Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 (1967). The court held that the development of water necessitates strict adherence to statutory sanctions, without nonconformance or delay-"lest our whole economy lag to the detriment of our future." Id. at 791.
67. 659 P.2d at 565.
68. See supra note 17.
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heavily on the maxim in refusing to grant forfeitures. 69 For example, in a
1939 case the court's dislike of forfeitures was decisive in holding the
statute inapplicable where nonuse was caused by circumstances beyond the
appropriator's control, despite the fact that the statute made no mention of
such an exception.7 0 In a 1937 case, the court found the statute to require
clear and convincing evidence of nonuse before a forfeiture could be
declared, although the statute then in effect contained no such requirement. 71 The statute in effect in 1955 did not expressly provide that a formal
declaration of forfeiture was necessary before a right would be deemed2
lost; the court nonetheless held that such a declaration was necessary.
Finally, despite the absence of such considerations in the language of the
statute, the court has looked to principles of equity and public policy in
refusing to declare a water right forfeited.

In Sturgeon, for example, the court expressly declared that public
policy did not require that the forfeiture statute be construed so strictly as
78
to deprive an appropriator of the benefits of his labor and expenditures.
Sturgeon has since been said to suggest that "estoppel may be applied to
prevent the harsh results of forfeiture where the alleged nonuser has expended substantial funds in reapplying the water to a beneficial use, or
the commencement
where a substantial period of time has elapsed7between
4
of the action and the alleged nonuse period."1

Thus, until LaramieRivers, the supreme court had not felt constrained
to look only at the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.
Instead, it affirmatively applied the principle that forfeitures are not
favored. With that principle, the court combined considerations of equity
and public policy. The result was an approach which promoted fairness and
flexibility. The facts present in Laramie Rivers could have easily been applied to reach a similar result.
First, prior to commencement of the forfeiture action, Laramie Rivers
Company had attempted to obtain funds to repair the dam in compliance
with a state imposed restriction on its use of a portion of its water right. 78
The Company finally received a loan for $142,000 in 1980. Second, the
State Engineer approved the Company's plans for repair, despite the fact
69. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
70. Scherck v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4, 24, 95 P.2d 74, 80 (1939). The statute construed by the
court was then codified as Wyo. REv. STAT. § 122421 (1931).
71. Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 529,69 P.2d 535, 539 (1937). (The statute construed by
the court was the same as that in Scherck.)
72. Sturgeon v. Brooks, 73 Wyo. 436, 458, 281 P.2d 675, 683 (Wyo. 1955). The statute constried by the court was then codified as Wyo. Coms'. STAT. § 71-701 (1945).
73. 281 P.2dat 685.
74. Novak, Abandonment and Forfeiture:How to Hold a Water Right as Development Takes
Place, 28 RocKY MT. MrN. L. INsT. 1249, 1271 (1982).

75. Brief for Appellees, supra note 2, at 2.
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that he must have known the water right was subject to forfeiture 76 and
that he had the statutory authority to initiate forfeiture proceedings
himself under these circumstances. 77 Third, Laramie Rivers Company had
executed a contract for the repairs, and work had commenced prior to the
filing of the forfeiture petition. 7 Fourth, Wheatland Irrigation could have
filed its petition at least as early as 1977,79 yet failed to do so until three
years later-after Laramie Rivers Company had commenced efforts at considerable expense to restore its water right.
The intent of Laramie Rivers Company to restore use of the water was
clear. Reasonable efforts to do so had commenced. Wheatland Irrigation
could have filed its petition at least three years earlier. Under these circumstances, and in light of prior case law, the supreme court should not
have felt constrained to forfeit the water right in question. While it is true
that LaramieRivers represents the first case in which the court confronted
the question of whether efforts to restore a water right are sufficient to
prevent forfeiture absent actual use of the water, that distinction does not
justify the court's departure from prior case law. The distinction created by
the court between use of the water and reasonable efforts to restore use is
artificial, unnecessary, and unfair. While this distinction may be suggested
by a strict reading of the statute, it does not effectively promote the policy
upon which the statute is based.
The effect of the court's rulings in Laramie Rivers is to impede rather
than promote the policy of beneficial use of available water. It does so by
discouraging appropriators from attempting to revive unused water rights.
The distinction created by the court between use of the water and efforts to
restore use significantly reduces any incentive an appropriator may
previously have had to expend the time, effort and capital to restore an
unused water right. If a forfeiture petition can be filed at any time prior to
actual use of the water, whether a project to restore use is one-fourth or
three-fourths complete, the risk may well outweigh the appropriator's interest in restoring his right. The court's holding, therefore, does not inspire
efforts to restore use; instead it increases the uncertainty already inherent
in a water right to a degree that discourages such efforts.8 0
Further, the court's holding in Laramie Rivers raises questions about
the status of existing water rights. Where safety considerations demand
76. This suggestion is based on the fact that Laramie Rivers Co. was notified of the restrictions imposed on the Lake Hattie dam by letter from the State Engineer. The letter in-

77.
78.
79.

80.

cluded no time limit on the repairs. When the State Engineer received the company's
plans for repair, he must have realized that they were in response to his limitations on
storage imposed eight years earlier.
See supra text accompanying note 22.
659 P.2d at 564.
The restrictions on the amount of water that could be stored in the reservoir were effective in 1972. Therefore, the statutory five year period had run by 1977 and Wheatland Irrigation could have filed a forfeiture petition. However, counsel for Wheatland Irrigation
claimed that water from the reservoir had not been applied to beneficial use for two years
prior to the State Engineer's order. Therefore, Wheatland Irrigation could have commenced a forfeiture action as early as 1975. Brief for Appellant at 3, Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Laramie Rivers Co., 659 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1983).
For a discussion of the uncertainties inherent in water rights, see Dewsnup, Assembling
Water Rights for a New Use: Needed Reforms in the Law, 17 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INsT.
613, 630 (1972).
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temporary nonuse of a portion of a water right, the decision may lead to
loss of water rights by major appropriators simply because funding, planning, and work designed to restore use of the water cannot be completed
within the statutory five year period.8 1 The prospect of losing part of a
water right may in turn deter appropriators from making necessary repairs
and may thus perpetuate unsafe conditions.
Finally, the court's ruling in Laramie Rivers raises questions about
future development in Wyoming. In light of that ruling, it is apparently impossible to reserve water for future use once it has been applied to
beneficial use. Yet, under some circumstances there may be a need to hold
a water right without use as development occurs. 82 In addition, although
conservation of water has not been a primary concern in the past, it is likely
to become so as demand for water increases and the already limited supply
decreases. As a result, the policy of promoting maximum use of available
water may find itself replaced by policies promoting conservation and more
efficient use of existing supplies. 83 The notion that an appropriator must
use his full entitlement, whether he needs it in a particular year or not, or
risk losing it may be forced to give way as pressures on available water increase. The Board of Control and the courts must begin consideration of
such factors now if Wyoming is to remain in the forefront of modern water
law. In addition, consideration should be given to possible changes in the
Wyoming forfeiture statute.
SUGGESTED STATUTORY CHANGES

In Laramie Rivers, the court relied almost exclusively on the language
of section 41-3-401 of the Wyoming Statutes in declaring the contested
water right forfeited. If the court continues to approach forfeiture cases on
the basis of strict statutory construction, the problems and inequities which
result will continue as well. In order to remedy the situation, the following
statutory changes are recommended.
First, the statute should provide that either use of the water or
reasonable efforts to restore use prior to commencement of the forfeiture
action will prevent application of the statute.84 Such a provision would not
81. Minutes, State Board of Control Meeting in Cheyenne, Wyoming, p. 77 (August, 1983).
The holders of a reservoir permit for Jackson Lake requested an extension in connection
with the unused storage capacity in Jackson Lake Reservoir. The Board concluded that
such an extension could not be allowed because the law under which it was sought did not
cover capacity presently constructed and not being used. Id. at 78.
82. For a discussion of some circumstances where there might be a need to hold awater right
without use as development occurs see, Novak, supranote 74, at 1273-74.
83. Pring and Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriersto Conservation andEfficient Use of
Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 25-1, 25-21 (1979).
84. An example of a provision of this type is found in the Texas forfeiture statute which provides in part:
At the conclusion of the hearing, the commission shall cancel the permit,
certified filing, or certificate of adjudication to the extent that it finds that:
(1) any portion of the water appropriated under the permit, certified filing, or
certificate of adjudication has not been put to an authorized beneficial use
during the 10-year period;
(2) the holder has not used reasonable diligence in applying the unused portion of the water to an authorized beneficial use; and
(3) the holder has not been justified in the nonuse or does not then have a bona
fide intention of putting the unused water to an authorized beneficial use
within a reasonabletime after the hearing.
Tnx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.182 (Vernon 1982) (emphasis added).
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only prevent the inequitable result reached in Laramie Rivers but it would
encourage appropriators to restore unused rights.
Second, the statute should provide an appropriator the opportunity to
show reasonable cause for nonuse whether or not he has applied for an extension. 85 Presently, the statute provides for such a showing only after application for extension. It thereby excludes appropriators who are attempting to resume use of the water following a temporary period of nonuse.
Third, the statute should provide an appropriator the opportunity to
.apply for an extension where he intends to resume use of the water.""
Presently the statute allows an extension only where the water has "not
yet" been used. There is no rational reason for allowing an extension where
water has never been used, and not allowing one where water has been
used.
Fourth, the statute should provide that when the State Engineer has
reason to believe that an appropriator has forfeited his right, the State
Engineer shall initiate forfeiture proceedings. 87 Presently section 41-3-402
of the Wyoming Statutes provides that the State Engineer may initiate
forfeiture proceedings. That the current provision may lead to inequitable
results is aptly illustrated in LaramieRivers. 8 The State Engineer knew
the full water right was not being beneficially used because of the restriction imposed in 1972. Nonetheless, he approved Laramie Rivers Company's
plans for repair eight years later without giving any indication that the
right was subject to forfeiture. With the State Engineer's approval in hand,
Laramie Rivers Company began the repairs. Under these circumstances, it
was inequitable for the court to declare the right forfeited. When the State
Engineer knows a right has not been used for the statutory period and is
requested to take affirmative action with respect to the restoration of the
right, it would not be unduly burdensome to require him to initiate
forfeiture proceedings. Alternatively, he should be required to notify the
appropriator of the possibility of forfeiture.
CONCLUSION

In Laramie Rivers, the Wyoming Supreme Court established the rule
that forfeitures of water rights under section 41-3-401 of the Wyoming
Statutes may only be avoided by application of the water to beneficial use.
85. Id.
86. The Utah forfeiture statute provides for an extension not exceeding five years within
which to "mi e use of water. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4 (1980).
87. The forfeiture statutes of Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Texas provide that the
state engineer or authorized agency shall initiate forfeiture proceedings where an appropriator fails to use the water for the specified number of years. The Montana statute
qualifies the authorized agency's obligation to initiate such proceedings by stating that it
must do so when there is reason to believe an appropriator may have forfeited his right.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2405 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-229.02 (1978); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 61-04-24 (Supp. 1981); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.174 (Vernon 1982). The
New Mexico statute provides that when an appropriator fails to use the water for the
specified number of years, the state engineer must give notice of nonuse to the appropriator, and, if one year after receiving notice, the appropriator fals to use the water,
it reverts to the public. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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Thus, undertaking efforts to repair a dam in order to put a reservoir back
into use will not prevent forfeiture, even if such efforts are commenced
before a forfeiture petition is filed.
In construing the phrase "use of the water" in its narrowest sense, the
court departed from its traditional approach to forfeiture cases. Prior to
Larcmie Rivers, the court had relied heavily on the principle that
forfeitures are not favored in law to refuse to find a forfeiture of water
rights. With this principle, the court combined considerations of equity and
public policy. The result was a series of forfeiture cases in which the court
advocated considerations of equity and flexibility over strict statutory construction.
With the Laramie Rivers decision, however, the court has retreated
from such considerations. In doing so, it may well be guilty of impeding the
policy upon which the forfeiture statute is based. The distinction created by
the court between use of the water and other efforts to restore such use is
less likely to promote the policy of beneficial use of available water than it is
to impede that policy.
As growth continues in the west, the pressures placed on our system of
water allocation will increase proportionately. Population growth alone is
certain to place greater demands on available water, not to mention
agricultural, industrial, and energy development. At the same time, environmental and recreational interests in preserving some water for nonconsumptive uses are likely to remain in the forefront of public concern.
These are but a few of the reasons that existing water law should be
carefully scrutinized to ensure that it is promoting rather than impeding
sound water policy.
KATHRYN JENKINS KAPP
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